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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Donald Rossignol, Jr., appeals from the district court's Memorandum Decision 
and Order in which the court denied Mr. Rossignol's petition for post-conviction relief. 
Mr. Rossignol asserts that the district court erred in denying his claim that his counsel 
were deficient in failing to inform him that the final decision on whether or not to testify 
was his, and that there is a reasonable probability that but for his counsels' errors, the 
result of his trial would have been different. Additionally, Mr. Rossignol asserts that his 
counsel deprived him of his right to testify by failing to obtain a knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary waiver, and that the deprivation of this right was not harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Finally, Mr. Rossignol asserts that the district court erred in denying 
his claim that his counsel were deficient in failing to timely subpoena and call to testify 
the alleged victim's physician, Dr. Schmidt, and that there is a reasonable probability 
that but for his counsels' errors, the result of his trial would have been different. 
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's assertions that 
Mr. Rossignol did not challenge the district court's factual findings and that 
Mr. Rossignol did not support some of his arguments with authority. All of the other 
arguments made by the State are sufficiently addressed in the Appellant's Brief and will 
not be addressed herein. 
1 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Rossignol's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but 
are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
2 
ISSUES1 
1) Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Rossignol's petition for post-
conviction relief as he showed by a preponderance of the evidence that his 
counsel was ineffective in failing to inform him that it was his decision whether to 
testify, regardless of his attorneys' advice, and had he testified, there is a 
reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different? 
2) Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Rossignol's petition for post-
conviction relief as he showed by a preponderance of the evidence that he did 
not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his right to testify and the State 
did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless? 
3) Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Rossignol's petition for post-
conviction relief because, had Dr. Schmidt testified, there is a reasonable 
probability that the result of the trial would have been different? 
1 The State's arguments concerning issues 2 and 3 were adequately addressed in the 




The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Rossignol's Petition For Post-Conviction 
Relief As He Showed By A Preponderance Of The Evidence That His Counsel Was 
Ineffective In Failing To Inform Him That It Was His Decision Whether To Testify, 
Regardless Of His Attorneys' Advice, And Had He Testified, There Is A Reasonable 
Probability That The Result Of The Trial Would Have Been Different 
Mr. Rossignol Sufficiently Addressed The District Court's Factual Findings And 
Sufficiently Supported His Arguments With Authority 
The district court's finding that Mr. Rossignol knew that he had a right to testify is 
not in dispute. In his Appellant's Brief Mr. Rossignol asserted that the question 
presented was "whether Mr. Rossignol knew that his right to testify was not limited by 
his attorney's advice, i.e., whether Mr. Rossignol knew that the choice of whether to 
exercise his right to testify was his, and was not for his counsel to determine." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.9.) The State asserted that Mr. Rossignol "failed to claim, much 
less demonstrate, clear error in the district court's factual findings." (Respondent's 
Brief, p.5.) The State fails to grasp Mr. Rossignol's argument. As he noted in his 
Appellant's Brief, "[t]he district court never made a specific finding on whether or not 
counsel informed Mr. Rossignol that that final decision on whether he would testify 
rested with him, rather than with counsel." (Appellant's Brief, p. 12 (citing R., pp.229-
239).) Mr. Rossignol acknowledges that the district court found that he knew that he 
had a right to testify and that he abided by his counsel's advice not to testify. However, 
Mr. Rossignol's claim is that his counsel never informed him that the final decision on 
whether or not to testify belonged solely to him. The State's assertion is irrelevant to 
the issue raised. 
4 
Furthermore, the State asserts that Mr. Rossignol failed to cite authority either for 
the proposition that "a valid waiver of the right to testify 'requires the defendant to 
actually know that he or she has this choice to make' (Appellant's brief, p.11) and to 
waive r1is right to testify he had to 'understand the parameters of that right' (Appellant's 
brief, p. 13)." (Respondent's Brief, p.9.) Mr. Rossignol asserts this proposition is 
obvious from the context of his argument and the plain and long-established meaning of 
the term "valid waiver." However, for additional authority, see Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 
U.S. 458 (1938), which holds that a "waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right or privilege." Id. at 464. 2 
Finally, the State argues, "It is telling that Rossignol has been unable to find 
any case holding that an attorney who has advised a defendant of a right must also 
inform the client that he is not required to accept the attorney's advice on 
whether to waive or assert that right in order to render effective assistance of counsel." 
(Respondent's Brief, p.9.) Mr. Rossignol acknowledges that Idaho Courts have not 
adopted the position that he proposes. However, Mr. Rossignol did, in fact, ask this 
Court to hold that where defense counsel fails to inform the defendant that the final 
decision on whether or not to testify lies with the defendant, that counsel's performance 
is deficient. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.9-12.) He supported his argument by citing to 
Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 761 (1988) and State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho 4, 9 (1975), 
in which the Idaho Supreme Court acknowledges that ABA standards are the starting 
2 Should the State wish to address Johnson v. Zerbst or wish to make further argument 
that a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of a constitutional right can be made 
where a defendant does not know that he or she has that right, or does not understand 
the parameters of that right, Mr. Rossignol will not object to further briefing of tr1is issue 
by the State. 
5 
point in evaluating counsel's conduct, and further cited ABA Defense Function 
standards 4-5.1 (a) and 4-5.2(a)(iv). 3 (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Mr. Rossingol asserts 
that these ABA standards, when read together, direct an attorney to advise a defendant 
of the choices that that the defendant makes in a criminal prosecution, including the 
decision on whether or not to testify on his or her own behalf. Thus, Mr. Rossignol 
asserts that this Court should hold that counsel acts deficiently where counsel fails to 
inform a criminal defendant client that the client makes the decision on whether or not to 
testify on his or her own behalf. While Mr. Rossignol's reliance on those authorities 
could perhaps have been more explicit, the citations were nonetheless present and 
shaped Mr. Rossignol's argument in his Appellant's Brief. Again, any implication that 
Mr. Rossignol's argument is not supported by authority should be rejected. 
The State's additional arguments related to the issues raised in Mr. Rossignol's 
Appellant's Brief are not remarkable and need to be addressed further in this Reply 
Brief. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Rossignol respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order 
denying his petition for post-conviction relief, vacate his judgment of conviction, and 
remand his case to the district court for a new trial. 
J~SON C. PINTLER 
!6eputy State Appellate Public Defender 
3 See 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal justice section archive/crimjust stan 
dards dfunc blk.html#5.2 (last accessed October 31, 2011). 
6 
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